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Using insights from Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), we develop a 
theoretical framework for how speculative bubbles may materialize in securities markets. Our 
model and empirical analysis show that agents place undue emphasis on recent experience of risk 
and returns when developing future expectations.  
 
We use the aggregate investor allocation to equities (aggregate total market capitalization of 
equities divided by the price of all real liabilities outstanding), Tobin’s Q (the aggregate market 
price of equities divided by the replacement cost of nonfinancial firms’ assets), Shiller Total 
Return Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (TR CAPE), and Shiller Cyclically Adjusted 
Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) as proxy variables for bubbles. We find statistically significant, 
negative relationships between all four of these proxy variables and two dependent variables, 
Subsequent Ten-Year Annualized Cumulative Equity Market Returns (Nominal and Real), and 
also Subsequent 10-year Average Losses, thereby providing evidence against the Efficient 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis is by far the most important and commonly accepted theory 
regarding the functioning of financial markets. Its essential truth that financial markets quickly 
incorporate new information into prices serves as a bedrock of modern financial theory. 
However, the assumptions that the hypothesis relies on are questionable. Milton Friedman 
explains how these two statements can hold simultaneously for such an important theory: 
 
“In so far as a theory can be said to have ‘assumptions’ at all, and in so far as their ‘realism’ 
can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the 
significance of a theory and the ‘realism’ of its ‘assumptions’ is almost the opposite of that 
suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and significant hypotheses will be 
found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, 
and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this 
sense).  The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’ much by little, that 
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and 
detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid 
predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be 
descriptively false in its assumptions; The converse of the proposition does not of course 
hold: assumptions that are unrealistic (in this sense) do not guarantee a significant theory 
takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its 
very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.”1 
 
One of the core tenets of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is that investors are rational, and 
maximize expected returns for a given level of expected risk. While this seems to be fairly 
reasonable, the hypothesis also stipulates that investors have homogenous expectations, and that 
they incorporate all accessible information into these expectations. 
 
We disagree with this assumption; we believe that people develop irrational expectations. Since 
the value of financial assets are not directly observable, investors must make guesses as to the 
actual value of the underlying asset. Investors can vary wildly in their methods of analysis, 
expected holding periods, risk preferences, as well as any number of other factors. The market is 
a voting mechanism by which investors cast their ballots and hope that their analysis of a 
financial asset is closer to true value than everyone else. If they are correct (or lucky) they profit, 
and if they are wrong (or unlucky) they take losses. As a result, we imagine “market price 
fluctuations as a consequence of a seesaw or pendulum-like mechanism, by which prices ‘orbit’ 
around value, such that Pt ≈ Vt, most of the time.”2  
 
We believe that prices can (and do) diverge so far away from this unobservable value that it may 
constitute a speculative bubble; the presence of which is hypothetically impossible under the 
                                                 
1 Milton Friedman "The Methodology of Positive Economics" Essays In Positive Economics (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-16, 30-43. 
2 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative Bubbles”. 






Efficient Market Hypothesis. We hypothesize that this is because investors place undue emphasis 




Empirical testing of the Efficient Market Hypothesis must be done with regard to an asset pricing 
model. The difficulty in testing the hypothesis is that pricing models that appear to be 
empirically invalid do not necessarily invalidate the EMH. Most proponents would argue that the 
asset pricing specifications are simply incorrect, and that the theoretical basis for these asset 
pricing tests is still correct. This is the famous joint hypothesis problem. 
 
Since asset pricing tests are incapable of invalidating the hypothesis, we take a different 
approach. Some of the most commonly used asset pricing models, in particular the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model3 and the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Formula4, both assume that stock prices 
exhibit Brownian motion (stochastic price movements with drift) which is broadly consistent 
with the idea that price shocks are the result of new information being incorporated into prices.  
 
The presence of these price shocks from new information could have significant effects when 
people extrapolate out recent experience of returns and risk when forming expectations of the 
future. A series of random shocks in one direction could result in a slight divergence in value, 
however, if “investors start to believe that there is something new about the market”5, the 
implication is that future expectations of returns and risk will be biased.6 Following a series of 
positive shocks, expected returns will be biased upwards while expectations of risk will be 
biased downwards, and vice versa. In the paper “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and 
Risk”, the authors evaluated the “Value” factor that is commonly used in many models 
constructed using Arbitrage Pricing Theory, and hypothesized why high book to market firms 
may have outperformed low book to market firms over their analysis period: 
 
“Individual investors might focus on glamour strategies for a variety of reasons. First, 
they may make judgment errors and extrapolate past growth rates of glamour stocks, such 
as Walmart or Home Depot, even when such growth rates are highly unlikely to persist in 
the future. Putting excessive weight on recent past history, as opposed to a rational 
prior, is a common judgment error in psychological experiments, and not just in the 
stock market. Alternatively, individuals might just equate well-run firms with good 
investments regardless of price. After all, how can you lose money on Microsoft or 
                                                 
3Although every asset pricing model is a capital asset pricing model, the finance profession reserves the acronym 
CAPM for the specific model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) discussed here. Thus, throughout 
the paper we refer to the Sharpe – Lintner – Black model as the CAPM. (Fama French 2003) 
4 Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes. “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.” Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 81, no. 3, 1973, pp. 637–654. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1831029. 
5 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative Bubbles”. 
BA, 2014. https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir%3A102322 
6 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative Bubbles”. 





Walmart? Indeed, brokers always recommend "good" companies, with "steady" earnings 
and dividend growth.”7 
 
The authors go on to explain that while institutional investors should be freer from these sorts of 
judgement biases than individuals, and would ordinarily flock to these types of strategies that 
appear to be a “free lunch”, there are other concerns that they need to deal with: 
 
“Another important factor is that most investors have shorter time horizons than are 
required for value strategies to consistently pay off (De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990)). Many individuals look for stocks that will earn them high abnormal 
returns within a few months, rather than 4 percent per year over the next 5 years. 
Institutional money managers often have even shorter time horizons. They often cannot 
afford to underperform the index or their peers for any nontrivial period of time, for if 
they do, their sponsors will withdraw the funds.”8 
 
This career risk that institutional investors face is just one of a few reasons why money managers 
may make decisions that are not in the best interests of their clients when incentives are not 
perfectly aligned. Note that this is largely because of client demands on managers though. If 
investment managers were able to act without constraints, they would likely arbitrage a situation 
where investment expectations are biased, and make money for his/her clients. This major 
constraint on the “smart money” managers in the marketplace further emphasizes the point that 
financial asset markets may develop speculative bubbles based on biased expectations because 
aggregate level asset allocations are not being made by the “smart money”; it is being made by 
the average person who knows very little about the stock market.  
 
a. Asset Pricing Models 
 
Since the EMH can only be tested against a model of asset pricing, the EMH is essentially 
impossible to disprove with this method. Any empirical test of the EMH using an asset pricing 
model that fails to explain returns cannot be used to disprove the EMH; the focus always comes 
back to the variables utilized in the asset pricing model. According to John Sherman, “All asset-
pricing models depend on an accurate assessment of risk to determine value.”9  
 
Prior to the 1990s, the most commonly accepted asset pricing model was the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model based on the work of William F. Sharpe (1964)10, John Lintner (1965)11, and 
                                                 
7 LAKONISHOK, J. , SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R. W. (1994), Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. 
The Journal of Finance, 49: 1541-1578. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x 
8 LAKONISHOK, J. , SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R. W. (1994), Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. 
The Journal of Finance, 49: 1541-1578. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x 
9 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative Bubbles”. 
BA, 2014. https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir%3A102322 
10 Sharpe, William F. “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk.” The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 19, no. 3, 1964, pp. 425–442. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2977928. 
11 Lintner, John. “The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and 







Fischer Black (1972)12. The model stipulates that the expected return for a given asset i is equal 
to the risk-free rate (for the holding period) plus beta of the asset times the expected market risk 
premium over the risk-free rate:  
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
 
where 𝛽 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑚
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑚
 and the United States Treasury Yield (over the holding period) 
usually acts as a proxy for the risk-free rate. The ex-post version of the test is as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ [𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓] + 𝜀 
 
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French summarize the attractiveness and issues of the model: 
 
The attraction of the CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions 
about how to measure risk and the relation between expected return and risk. 
Unfortunately, the empirical record of the model is poor – poor enough to invalidate 
the way it is used in applications. The CAPM’s empirical problems may reflect 
theoretical failings, the result of many simplifying assumptions. But they may also be 
caused by difficulties in implementing valid tests of the model. For example, the CAPM 
says that the risk of a stock should be measured relative to a comprehensive 
“market portfolio” that in principle can include not just traded financial assets, but 
also consumer durables, real estate, and human capital. Even if we take a narrow 
view of the model and limit its purview to traded financial assets, is it legitimate to 
further limit the market portfolio to U.S. common stocks (a typical choice), or should the 
market be expanded to include bonds, and other financial assets, perhaps around the 
world? In the end, we argue that whether the model’s problems reflect weaknesses in 
the theory or in its empirical implementation, the failure of the CAPM in empirical 
tests implies that most applications of the model are invalid.13 
 
Ordinarily, empirical tests of asset pricing models include the stock market as a proxy for the 
market because of ease of access to data; this fact alone makes empirical pricing tests extremely 
questionable because the true theoretical market return is nearly impossible (if not impossible) to 
observe. Using the expected market premium denoted by [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] is also questionable. The 
“risk-free” rate of return isn’t actually risk-free. There is risk inherent in holding the United 
States’ Federal Treasury Securities. The United States can only sustain a debt burden of so much 
before it would be unable to pay back its creditors in real terms – a country can only increase tax 
receipts by so much through explicit taxes and/or seigniorage before economic output falls due to 
overly burdensome taxes and/or hyperinflation causing instability. 
 
                                                 
12 Black, Fischer, (1972), Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing, The Journal of Business, 45, issue 
3, p. 444-55. 
13 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence (August 2003). 
CRSP Working Paper No. 550; Tuck Business School Working Paper No. 03-26. Available at 





While Fama mentions that the CAPM has been a failure at least empirically, and possibly 
theoretically, it does not necessarily preclude the presence of another superior asset pricing 
model that is empirically valid. Arbitrage Pricing Theory is the study of market factors which 
may close the gap between the predicted returns of a basic model like CAPM and provide 
portfolio managers with superior returns by closing these gaps. However, the EMH implies that 
any variable incorporated into an asset pricing model should account for some risk related to the 
asset being valued. The problem is compounded when variables which appear to carry no risk are 
incorporated into models show greater explanatory power than those with seemingly solid 
theoretical risks.  
 
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French created an empirically superior model to the CAPM in 
1992.14 Their 3-factor model of asset pricing in 1992 uses market beta as well as 2 additional 
factors: “size” (market capitalization) and “value” (book price of equity/market price of equity). 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖1 ∗ [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] + 𝛽𝑖2 ∗ 𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽𝑖3 ∗ 𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿)  
 
Where SMB is the market capitalization premium (small minus big), and HML is the value 
premium (high B/M minus low B/M). While empirical tests of this model tend to perform better 
than the CAPM, the evidence suggesting that these are additional risk factors is weak. Eugene 
Fama himself has argued that the three-factor model’s grounding is very weak: 
“I’ve spent a good part of the last 40 years testing those models. And a result of a lot of 
that is the so-called Fama-French three-factor model. It’s widely used both by 
academics and in industry. [He chuckles.] I’m laughing because the theoretical basis 
for the model is quite shaky. Basically, we saw these patterns in returns and our 
motivation was to try to explain them.”15 
Whether these proxy for risk is also questionable. Fama explains: 
 
The discussion […] assumes that the asset-pricing effects captured by size and book-to-
market equity are rational. For BE/ME (book price of equity to market price of equity), 
our most powerful expected-return variable, there is an obvious alternative. The cross-
section of book-to-market ratios might result from market overreaction to the 
relative prospects of firms. If overreaction tends to be corrected, BE/ME will predict 
the cross-section of stock returns.16 
 
While the theoretical basis for the CAPM seems to make sense (despite its empirical failings) 
because it captures some element of the systematic risk that portfolios may fall with the market, 
size and value are both highly questionable in comparison. Do small stocks outperform because 
they are riskier, or because investment managers have discounted their value irrationally? Do 
                                                 
14 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 47, no. 2, 1992, pp. 427–465. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2329112. 
15 Sommer, Jeff. “Eugene Fama: King of Predictable Markets”. The New York Times 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business/eugene-fama-king-of-predictable-markets.html 
16 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” The Journal of 





high B/M firms outperform because there is something inherently riskier about them, or is it 
because low B/M tend to have overly optimistic prospects that lead to disappointment?17 
Whether or not they proxy for risk, there is cause to believe that there are other additional 
indicators which may provide insight into returns. 
 
Quantitative analysts spend their time working on developing asset pricing models and arbitrage 
strategies to find profitable strategies that exploit mispricing in financial markets. They work 
tirelessly in effort of finding the best combination of indicators that capture variation in returns; 
they conduct principle component analyses to minimize the number of real-time variables in 
models to avoid overfitting. 
 
However, the methods by which quantitative analysts manufacture valuation models are often 
flawed. Since the volume of data about companies that can be produced in real-time has 
increased substantially since the late 1980s, there has been a shift to focus on building asset 
pricing models which incorporate the most cross-sectional information at the expense of the 
length of the time series. There is an enormous responsibility of quantitative analysts to balance 
the amount of real-time information incorporated into a model and the quality/variation in the 
data going into the models. Since many firms only use data collected since the late-1980s for 
their models, it is unlikely capturing very many rare event occurrences in the markets. These rare 
“black-swan” events fall far outside of the ordinarily predicted normal distribution that some 
asset pricing models use (for the sake of elegance). Rare events are difficult enough to predict 
with 150 or so years of data; reducing the number of years in the sample can only make the 
models less effective at making inferences about out of sample data. 
 
While the empirical faults of pricing model building are unfortunate, the real harm caused by the 
models lies in their widespread applications. Despite the overwhelming evidence showing that 
CAPM is empirically invalid, investment banks tend to use CAPM with modifications to 
calculate the discount rate used in valuation models for individual companies. The betas that are 
inappropriately used in these models should really only be used to evaluate the undiversifiable 
“risk” of a diversified portfolio of stocks (not individual companies). Regressions that attempt to 
test covariance of individual stocks with the market often return standard errors that produce 
extremely large and useless confidence intervals for beta of an individual security. Unscrupulous 
investment bankers may use these large confidence intervals to their advantage, and deliberately 
reduce the discount rate in valuation models by using CAPM to calculate cost of equity in order 
to inflate valuations. Investment practitioners may even use the 3-factor model as a substitute for 
fundamental stock analysis and good judgement. 
 
The truth is that “the more we learn about financial markets, the more it seems that we are unable 
to accurately determine the inherent risk of various financial securities.18” 
 
b. Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis & Instability Inherent in 
Capitalist Economies 
                                                 
17 LAKONISHOK, J. , SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R. W. (1994), Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and 
Risk. The Journal of Finance, 49: 1541-1578. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x 
18 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative 






In May of 1992, Hyman Minsky’s paper entitled “The Financial Instability Hypothesis” was 
published; the paper provides a framework to distinguish between stabilizing and destabilizing 
capitalist debt structures:   
 
“Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, which are labeled as hedge, 
speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified. Hedge financing units are those 
which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the 
greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood 
that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet 
their payment commitments on "income account" on their liabilities, even as they 
cannot repay the principle out of income cash flows. Such units need to "roll over" 
their liabilities: (e.g. issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing debt). 
Governments with floating debts, corporations with floating issues of commercial paper, 
and banks are typically hedge units. For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations 
are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on 
outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or 
borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) 
on common stock lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior 
commitment of future incomes. A unit that Ponzi finances lowers the margin of safety 
that it offers the holders of its debts. It can be shown that if hedge financing 
dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing 
system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the 
greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation-amplifying system.”19 
 
Minsky goes on further to explain how these various unstable financing regimes come about as 
the result of prolonged periods of stability: 
 
“The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has 
financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. 
The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of 
prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. In particular, over a 
protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial 
structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large 
weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy 
with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the 
authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units 
will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly 
evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make 
position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values. The 
financial instability hypothesis is a model of a capitalist economy which does not rely 
upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity. The hypothesis 
                                                 
19 Minsky, Hyman P., The Financial Instability Hypothesis (May 1992). The Jerome Levy Economics Institute 






holds that business cycles of history are compounded out of (i) the internal dynamics 
of capitalist economies, and (ii) the system of interventions and regulations that are 
designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable bounds.”20 
 
Minsky’s insights about the nature of speculative and Ponzi financing in the late stages of the 
business cycle align perfectly with those of Michael Burry, who is widely believed to have been 
the first portfolio manager to bet against the housing market in 2005 by harassing Wall Street 
banks into selling him credit default swaps (insurance contracts that pay off in the event that the 
underlying bond defaults): 
 
In the second quarter of 2005, credit-card delinquencies hit an all-time high—even 
though house prices had boomed. That is, even with this asset to borrow against, 
Americans were struggling more than ever to meet their obligations. The Federal 
Reserve had raised interest rates, but mortgage rates were still effectively falling—
because Wall Street was finding ever more clever ways to enable people to borrow 
money. Burry now had more than a billion-dollar bet on the table and couldn’t grow it 
much more unless he attracted a lot more money. So, he just laid it out for his investors: 
the U.S. mortgage-bond market was huge, bigger than the market for U.S. Treasury notes 
and bonds. The entire economy was premised on its stability, and its stability in turn 
depended on house prices continuing to rise. “It is ludicrous to believe that asset bubbles 
can only be recognized in hindsight,” he wrote. “There are specific identifiers that are 
entirely recognizable during the bubble’s inflation. One hallmark of mania is the rapid 
rise in the incidence and complexity of fraud.… The FBI reports mortgage-related 
fraud is up fivefold since 2000.” Bad behavior was no longer on the fringes of an 
otherwise sound economy; it was its central feature. “The salient point about the 
modern vintage of housing-related fraud is its integral place within our nation’s 
institutions,” he added.21 
 
Even in the face of overwhelming evidence that the market was unsustainable, the market kept 
on chugging until 2007.  
 
“As early as 2004, if you looked at the numbers, you could clearly see the decline in 
lending standards. In Burry’s view, standards had not just fallen but hit bottom. The 
bottom even had a name: the interest-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate 
subprime mortgage. You, the homebuyer, actually were given the option of paying 
nothing at all, and rolling whatever interest you owed the bank into a higher principal 
balance. It wasn’t hard to see what sort of person might like to have such a loan: one 
with no income.” 
 
Despite all of these very clear issues with the housing market, Burry’s investors still doubted him 
because of the short-term changes in the portfolio’s value due to the premiums paid to maintain 
the credit default swap positions:  
                                                 
20 Minsky, Hyman P., The Financial Instability Hypothesis (May 1992). The Jerome Levy Economics Institute 
Working Paper No. 74. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=161024 or   
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161024 






“Now he had to explain that they had to subtract from that number these & subprime-
mortgage-bond insurance premiums. One of his New York investors called and said 
ominously, ‘You know, a lot of people are talking about withdrawing funds from 
you.’ As their funds were contractually stuck inside Scion Capital for some time, the 
investors’ only recourse was to send him disturbed-sounding e-mails asking him to justify 
his new strategy. ‘People get hung up on the difference between +5% and -5% for a 
couple of years,’ Burry replied to one investor who had protested the new strategy. 
‘When the real issue is: over 10 years who does 10% or better annually? And I 
firmly believe that to achieve that advantage on an annual basis, I have to be able to look 
out past the next couple of years.… I have to be steadfast in the face of popular 
discontent if that’s what the fundamentals tell me.’ In the five years since he had 
started, the S&P 500, against which he was measured, was down 6.84 percent. In the 
same period, he reminded his investors, Scion Capital was up 242 percent.”22 
 
Despite Burry’s significant outperformance of the market based on clear value investing 
principles, his clients still didn’t trust him to make investment decisions because of their 
unrelenting focus on short term price changes. Burry had the benefit of running a hedge fund that 
allowed him to lock up investor funds and forbid withdrawals in the face of this change in 
sentiment among his clients. Even with these provisions, Burry’s clients whom he had once 
respected constantly harassed him and made his job miserable while waiting for the bet to pay 
off. Investors like Michael Burry are unable to make these kinds of bets within the structure of 
ordinary mutual funds (excluding separately managed accounts). Mutual fund managers are 
subject to liquidity requirements and are forbidden from preventing withdrawals of investor 
capital. This once again underscores how the “smart money” investors are often at the whims of 
the masses when it comes to asset allocation strategies. 
 
This still doesn’t explain why investors were willing to purchase mortgage-backed securities that 
supported loans made to Speculative Borrowers and Ponzi Borrowers. Creditors lend to Ponzi 
borrowers because they also believe that prices of the underlying asset will increase and/or the 
borrower will be able to refinance the loan. Minsky argued that protracted periods of stable good 
economic conditions will ultimately lead to a greater proportion of debt in the hands of 
speculators and Ponzi borrowers; we believe that this is because of people irrationally placing 
emphasis on recent experience when developing their expectations of the future.  
 
c. The Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities, Tobin’s Q, TR CAPE, CAPE, and 
Long-Term Reversion in Returns 
 
As John Sherman points out, “One of the most fascinating anomalies in securities markets is that 
of long-term reversals—that a series of high returns tends to be followed by low returns and vice 
versa.”23 As Eugene Fama explains: 
 
                                                 
22 Lewis, Michael M. The Big Short : [inside the Doomsday Machine]. New York :Simon & Schuster, 2010. 
23 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative 





“Ratios involving stock prices have information about expected returns missed by market 
betas. On reflection, this is not surprising. A stock’s price depends not only on the 
expected cash flows it will provide, but also on the expected returns that discount 
expected cash flows back to the present. Thus, in principle the cross-section of prices 
has information about the cross-section of expected returns. (A high expected return 
implies a high discount rate and a low price.) The cross-section of stock prices is, 
however, arbitrarily affected by differences in scale (or units). But with a judicious 
choice of scaling variable X, the ratio X/P can reveal differences in the cross-section of 
expected stock returns. Such ratios are thus prime candidates to expose shortcomings 
of asset pricing models – in the case of the CAPM, shortcomings of the prediction 
that market betas suffice to explain expected returns (Ball, 1978)2425.” 
 
The Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities, Tobin’s Q, TR CAPE, and CAPE are some of 
these pricing indicators which fit Fama’s criteria; coincidentally all 4 show statistically 
significant negative correlation with subsequent 10-year real returns. 
 
Here is a graph of these indicators over time:  
 
                                                 
24 Ball, Ray. 1978. “Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities’ Yields and Yield-Surrogates.” Journal of 
Financial Economics. 6:2, pp. 103-126. 
25 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence (August 2003). 
CRSP Working Paper No. 550; Tuck Business School Working Paper No. 03-26. Available at 






The Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities is of particular interest to us. Financial assets are 
unique in that someone must be in possession of them at any given time. When investors 
purchase and sell financial assets, they implicitly make decisions about the relative proportions 
of various assets that they hold. An investor may decide to allocate 40% of their savings to 
stocks, and another 60% to corporate bonds. Another may allocate 10% to treasury bills, 70% in 
mortgage-backed securities, and 20% in cash. Since these assets are always held by someone, we 
can aggregate the value of all of these securities across asset classes to determine the aggregate 
allocations to various classes of financial assets. This is of particular interest because of its 
relationship to the Efficient Market Hypothesis; rational expectations dictate that an 
individual investor’s allocation to a particular asset class will only increase if this investors’ 
risk-adjusted expected return has increased. This relationship must also hold in aggregate. 
The historical average aggregate investor allocation to equities between 1945 and 2018 has been 
roughly 34.7%. If historically high levels of the Aggregate Investor Allocation are associated 
with lower returns and higher levels of risk, this casts doubt upon the rational investor 
assumption of the EMH. 
 








Notice in the graph the two red reference lines. One corresponds to a real 10-year annualized 
return of 0%, and the other corresponds to 6.8% real annualized 10-year returns. 6.8% is roughly 
the geometric average real return from the end of 1871 to the end of 2018 (see appendix).  
 
Tobin’s Q was developed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin in 1968. It is the ratio between the 







“One, the numerator, is the market valuation: the going price in the market for 
exchanging existing assets. The other, the denominator, is the replacement or 
reproduction cost: the price in the market for the newly produced commodities. 
We believe that this ratio has considerable macroeconomic significance and 
usefulness, as the nexus between financial markets and markets for goods and 
services.” 26 27 
 
When the market price for a corporation is high relative to its replacement cost of net assets, this 
may attract new entrants; new entrants could effectively replicate the asset and then sell it in the 
market for a profit. The ensuing dynamics of competition would lead the market value to come 
down relative to its replacement cost. While a mean value of 1 for the total market would be 
expected, the historical average is actually around 0.6. This may be due to measurement error in 
the replacement cost of nonfinancial firms’ assets, which is estimated by the Federal Reserve 
Bank. It may be that the replacement cost of firms is overstated because GAAP depreciation 
methods understate depreciation expenses. We will not focus that much on the accounting 
nuances, but the end result is that replacement cost may biased upwards due to systematic 
measurement error, which leads Tobin’s Q to be biased downwards.  
 
The Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings ratio (CAPE) and Total Return CAPE (TR CAPE) are 
metrics created by Robert Shiller.  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 10 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
   
 
Total Return CAPE is nearly identical to CAPE; however, it makes corrections for changes in 
corporate dividend/buyback policy. TR CAPE and CAPE are interesting because historically 
high levels of CAPE indicate that the neither the overall level of earnings, nor earnings growth 
over the period have kept up with price increases over the same period. TR CAPE and CAPE 
have the most observations in our data since earnings and prices have been accurately recorded 
for indices since 1871. In contrast, the Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities and Tobin’s Q 
have only been consistently estimated since 1945. 
 
                                                 
26"Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital." James Tobin and W.C. Brainard, 1977, Economic Progress, Private 
Values and Public Policy 
27Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative Bubbles”. 





d. The Random Walk Assumption  
 
As mentioned earlier, both the Capital Asset Pricing Model28 and the Black-Scholes Option 
Pricing Formula assume that stock prices exhibit Brownian motion (stochastic price movements 
with drift) which is broadly consistent with the idea that price shocks are the result of randomly 
generated new information being incorporated into prices.  
 
This “random walk” is a fundamental assumption of the EMH, and has been broadly 
incorporated into financial theory (as exemplified by the CAPM and Black-Scholes models 
mentioned above). Here is an algebraic representation: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where 𝑉𝑡 is the natural log of the value of an asset, 𝛷𝑡 is the drift trend, and 𝜀𝑡 is a random shock 
in value which has the following properties: 
 
𝐸(𝜀𝑡) = 0  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡) = 𝜎2  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡−1) = 0 
 
The expected value of the shock 𝜀𝑡 is zero. Price shocks are assumed to have a log-normal 
distribution. Covariance between price shocks is zero, so price shocks are all independent of one 
another; historical price changes do not influence prices today.  
 
Our empirical regressions clearly indicate that past price shocks do have some relationship to 
future shocks, so in reality 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡−1) ≠ 0. 
 
Now in reality, prices do not follow a log-normal distribution. The log distribution of stock 
returns has fat-tails (kurtosis): 
 
“From 1916 to 2003, the daily index movements of the Dow Jones Industrial Average do 
not spread out on graph paper like a simple bell curve. The far edges flare too high: too 
many big changes. Theory suggests that over that time, there should be fifty-eight days 
when the Dow moved more than 3.4 percent; in fact, there were 1,001. Theory predicts 
six days of index swings beyond 4.5 percent; in fact, there were 366. And index swings 
of more than 7 percent should come once every 300,000 years; in fact, the twentieth 
century saw forty-eight such days. Truly, a calamitous era that insists on flaunting all 
prediction. Or, perhaps, our assumptions are wrong.”29 
 
III. Restructured Model with Endogenously Determined Expected Returns 
 
Now equity returns for individual companies (or the market) can conventionally be thought of 
this way: 
                                                 
28Although every asset pricing model is a capital asset pricing model, the finance profession reserves the acronym 
CAPM for the specific model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) discussed here. Thus, throughout 
the paper we refer to the Sharpe – Lintner – Black model as the CAPM. (Fama French 2003) 
29 Mandelbrot, Benoit; Hudson, Richard L. (2007-03-22). The Misbehavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Financial 






𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = Return from ∆
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡
(ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡) +
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 (ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒
𝑃
𝐸
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡) + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  
 
Returns over a given period are a function of price changes and dividend returns. Returns from 
the price change can be further disaggregated into return from a change in the price to earnings 
ratio (holding earnings constant) and return from a change in earnings (holding the price to 
earnings multiple constant).  
 
As mentioned earlier, price shocks can have significant effects if we relax the random walk 
assumption. If people extrapolate out recent experience of returns and risk when forming 
expectations of the future; a series of random shocks in one direction could result in a slight 
divergence in value, however, if “investors start to believe that there is something new about the 
market”30, future expectations of returns and risk will be biased. This bias in aggregate expected 
returns and aggregate expected risk leads to price ratios having explanatory power of subsequent 
returns (because they implicitly contain information about expected returns). 
 
The aggregate investor allocation is shown to explain the most variation in subsequent 10-year 
annualized real returns in our empirical section; now there is another very intuitive way to think 
about returns by substituting in the aggregate investor allocation for the price to earnings ratio. 
Instead of prices being linked to the underlying earnings of an asset, we link equity prices to the 
outstanding value of cash and bonds outstanding in the market. 
 
Now first, there are particular attributes of financial assets that allow this to be the case. All cash, 
bonds, and equities must be held by someone at any given point in time. When investors make 
explicit decisions about the proportions of each asset they will hold in their individual 
portfolio, the aggregate market allocations of these assets must implicitly shift through 
price changes to allow individuals to meet their explicit allocation targets. When cash and 
bonds increase in tandem with growth of the real economy, prices of equities must rise 
commensurately to maintain the same portfolio allocation. 
 
We create a model of equilibrium demand and supply for the aggregate investor allocation: 
 
In the equities market, demand is a function of expected returns and expected risk. 
Supply is a function of the # of shares available for purchase in the equities market and 
new share issuance. Demand shifts are a function of changes in expected returns and 
changes in expected risk. Supply shifts are a function of new issuance of equity. The 
vertical axis of the graph is the aggregate allocation to equities. Now demand is 
downward sloping to the right with a vertical intercept of 100% because the maximum 
percentage of a portfolio that an individual investor can own is 100%. The demand 
schedule consists of the target allocations of individual investors to equities. Supply is 
relatively inelastic and upward sloping since entrepreneurs are slightly responsive to high 
levels of the aggregate investor allocation; new companies can be sold at high prices 
                                                 
30 Sherman, John. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Financial Instability Hypothesis, and Speculative 





relative to the replacement cost of net assets (Tobin’s Q is somewhat correlated with the 
aggregate investor allocation, but the allocation carries more explanatory power). We 
assume supply is inelastic because ideas that warrant significant new equity issuance are 
not really responsive to the allocation, as the equity issuance would occur anyway to 
provide capital to fund the new business idea. Since average net issuance of equity in any 
given year tends to be very slightly negative because of stock buybacks (at least since the 
beginning of the 1980s), and expectations are more volatile, aggregate demand shifts tend 
to have a greater impact on the equilibrium market clearing aggregate investor allocation. 
 
Coincidentally, we can represent returns over any given period with a similar framework to the 
price to earnings framework described above: 
 
Total Returnt = Return from the change in 
(market value of equities)
market value of equities+ all other real financial liabilities31
 +
Return from change in the supply of bonds and cash (holding the aggregate investor allocation to equities constant) +
 +Dividend Return  
 
By thinking of price returns in terms of shifts in the aggregate investor allocation to equities and 
growth in the supply of bonds and cash (which tend to grow with the economy as a whole), we 
get a much more realistic picture of how demand and supply functions in financial markets. A 
significant proportion of subsequent 10-year annualized real returns can be explained in relation 
to changes in the aggregate investor allocation, much in the way that we think about price to 
earnings multiples. People intuitively react to high P/E multiples negatively because the earnings 
yield is implicitly low, and vice versa with low P/E multiples. We think much the same way with 
regards to the percentage of financial capital invested in the equities market; preferences for 
individual allocations may mean revert over time, and variation in preferences can be accounted 



















                                                 
31 See page 19 in the empirical results data section for a more in-depth explanation of how the aggregate investor 





IV. Empirical Results (2 sections) 
 
a. Subsequent Ten Year Cumulative Annualized Return Regressions 
 
1. Data 
Stock return, Shiller CAPE ratios, and the long interest rate come from Robert Shiller’s stock 
market data. This dataset can be found on Yale’s website at: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm  
 
Shiller explains how he constructed the dataset we pulled from his website32:  
“Stock market data used in my book, Irrational Exuberance [Princeton University Press 
2000, Broadway Books 2001, 2nd ed., 2005] are available for download, U.S. Stock 
Markets 1871-Present and CAPE Ratio. This data set consists of monthly stock price, 
dividends, and earnings data and the consumer price index (to allow conversion to real 
values), all starting January 1871. The price, dividend, and earnings series are from the 
same sources as described in Chapter 26 of my earlier book (Market 
Volatility [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989]), although now I use monthly data, rather 
than annual data. Monthly dividend and earnings data are computed from the S&P four-
quarter totals for the quarter since 1926, with linear interpolation to monthly figures. 
Dividend and earnings data before 1926 are from Cowles and associates (Common Stock 
Indexes, 2nd ed. [Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press, 1939]), interpolated from annual 
data. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices through January 2000, 
the last month available as this book goes to press. The CPI-U (Consumer Price Index-
All Urban Consumers) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begins in 1913; 
for years before 1913 1 spliced to the CPI Warren and Pearson's price index, by 
multiplying it by the ratio of the indexes in January 1913. December 1999 and January 
2000 values for the CPI-U are extrapolated. See George F. Warren and Frank A. 
Pearson, Gold and Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1935). Data are from their 
Table 1, pp. 11–14.  
 
As of September 2018, I now also include an alternative version of CAPE that is 
somewhat different. As documented in Bunn & Shiller (2014) and Jivraj and Shiller 
(2017), changes in corporate payout policy (i.e. share repurchases rather than dividends 
have now become a dominant approach in the United States for cash distribution to 
shareholders) may affect the level of the CAPE ratio through changing the growth rate of 
earnings per share. This subsequently may affect the average of the real earnings per 
share used in the CAPE ratio. A total return CAPE corrects for this bias through 
reinvesting dividends into the price index and appropriately scaling the earnings per 
share. “ 
 
Shiller’s dataset includes monthly data; however, we use annual end of year data to construct our 
key dependent variable: Ten Year Annualized Returns (Real & Nominal). We use cumulative 
annualized returns in order to explore the lagged or “persistence effect” of past price shocks. Ten 
years is a crude estimation that is roughly close to the average length of an average U.S. business 
                                                 






cycle (5-7 years). Periods significantly longer than 10 years may not be as memorable to 
investors so there may be less price to price feedback. Shiller’s stock data on the S&P 500 goes 
back until 1871, giving us 137 observations between 1871 and 2008.33 
 
Data for the aggregate investor allocation to equities can be calculated using Federal Reserve 
Data. The formula is calculated by dividing (Nonfinancial corporate business; corporate equities; 
liability, level + Financial business; corporate equities; liability, level) by ( Nonfinancial 
corporate business; corporate equities; liability, level + Financial business; corporate equities; 
liability, level + Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Credit Market Instruments; liability + 
Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Credit Market Instruments; liability, level + Federal 
Government; Credit Market Instruments; Liability, Level + State and Local Governments, 
Excluding Employee Retirement Funds; Credit Market Instruments; Liability, Level + Rest of 
the World; Credit Market Instruments; Liability, Level). The FRED codes are as follows: 
((NCBEILQ027S+FBCELLQ027S)/1000)/(((NCBEILQ027S+FBCELLQ027S)/1000)+BCNSD
ODNS+CMDEBT+FGSDODNS+SLGSDODNS+DODFFSWCMI). The 1000s are there to 
convert all of the numbers to the same units. A chart of the metric can be found at this link: 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=qis. Data on the aggregate investor allocation to equities 
begins in 1945, leaving us with 73 observations. Note that this is significantly fewer than with 
Shiller’s TR CAPE or Shiller’s CAPE. 
 
Data for Tobin’s Q was calculated using the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1 Financial 
Accounts of the United States and can be found at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. Tobin’s Q ratio can be calculated from 
the most recent Federal Reserve Flow of Funds release. The ratio is calculated by dividing line 
36 of table B.102 by line 33. We calculate Tobin’s Q through 2018. The Federal Reserve has 
data on Tobin’s Q beginning in 1945, leaving us with 73 observations. Note that when we 
complete regressions on 10-year returns, we will drop 10 observations from each one we run 
since we don’t have subsequent ten-year cumulative returns for 2009-2018, despite having other 
data for these years. 
 
I paraphrase John Sherman’s senior thesis, one of professor Petersen’s former students, to 
describe the nature of Tobin’s Q: 
 
Interestingly, Tobin’s Q is calculated using data from nonfinancial firms (i.e. it excludes 
data from banks, insurance companies, etc.). High values of Tobin’s Q are presumably a 
consequence of high growth and/or high profits, which pushes asset prices above their 
average replacement costs. If markets are efficient, high values of Q should be self-
correcting or self-reversing, so we shouldn’t get very high values of Q for sustained 
periods because profits attract new entrants. New firms enter the market and existing 
firms expand, and as investment in plant and equipment grows, a corresponding increase 
in the aggregate capital-labor ratio will result. Basic microeconomic theory suggests 
diminishing returns to capital set in and the profit rate will fall. Therefore, following high 
values of Q, we should expect lower returns in the following years.34 
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The theoretical basis for the aggregate investor allocation to equities is also very interesting. 
Since the allocation should be primarily determined by investors’ expected returns and risk, any 
variation must be accompanied by either change in the market’s expectation of return or risk 
(within the context of all assets available for purchase) according to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. As we will present in our regression results, subsequent return data directly 
contradicts the idea that higher allocations are met with higher returns and/or less risk, and vice 
versa (as would be suggested by the EMH). 
 
2. Dependent Variables for Subsequent Return Regressions 
We constructed cumulative returns in order to test if investors’ expectations of risk and return are 
consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Specifically, we use: 
a. Ten Year Annualized Returns (Nominal) 
b. Ten Year Annualized Returns (Real – adjusted by CPI in Shiller’s data) 
c. Average Annual Losses Over Next 10 Years (only includes years with losses) 
 
3. Independent Variables for Subsequent Return Regressions 
a. The Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities 
b. Tobin’s Q 
c. Shiller’s TR CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings ratio adjusted for 
dividend and buyback payout policy) 
d. Shiller’s CAPE 
e. Long Interest Rate (GS10) 
f. Greenspan Put  
 
Our first 4 independent variables all contain aggregate market prices for equities (whether 
financial, nonfinancial, or all) as well as some other data that informs investors about the asset 
they are purchasing and/or data about the broader market and past market behavior. The Long 
Interest Rate comes from Shiller’s data, and reflects historical 10-year Treasury yields in the 
United States. We construct another independent variable: Greenspan Put is a binary variable 
where every year including and following 1987 is equal to 1, otherwise 0. We construct this to 
denote Alan Greenspan’s suggestion in 1987 that Federal Reserve Monetary Policy will be eased 
to prop up equity valuations in the event of crises. Subsequent Federal Reserve Chairmen have 
been believed to follow similar strategies to attempt to prop up equity valuations, however it 
should be noted that regressions which included the Greenspan Put may just lead to spurious 
correlation. Since the mid-1990s equity valuations have been historically been on the higher side 
according to the other independent variables presented; as a result, the binary variable essentially 
creates a piecewise best fit function that jumps in 1987. Since the greatest stock market collapses 
have tended to coincide with recessions and reasonable Federal Reserve Policy in recessions 
would generally include monetary easing, the period following Greenspan’s announcement may 
simply coincide with more effective monetary policy implementations (on average) which have 
the added effect of leading investors to shift asset allocations towards risky assets; this is exactly 
what the Federal Reserve Bank intends in recessions as it stimulates greater economic 
productivity and reduces labor market slack. Despite this, we think that it would be interesting to 
run regressions with this indicator to see if it adds explanatory power to our other models (after 





4. Regression Specifications & Results 
 
We present evidence that is inconsistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. First, we assess 
the significance of these market indicators listed above and their relationship with subsequent 
10-year returns (nominal and real). Secondly, we test to see if our indicators may predict years of 
minimal losses over the following 10-year period. Thirdly, we assess possible determinants of 
the primary indicator of greatest significance: the aggregate investor allocation to equities.  
 
It is important to note that due to our current specifications, our observations are not independent 
because ten-year equity returns consist of an overlapping moving average. To correct for 
autocorrelation, which biases standard errors downwards (and t-statistics upwards), we run a 
Newey-West (1987)35 estimator; this is commonly used to correct for specifiable bias between 
observations in moving average variables. We specify a maximum of 9 lags since 10-year returns 
reported annually will have at most 9 years of overlapping annual returns. Our Newey-West 
corrections are stated alongside all of our regressions which require autocorrelation corrections 
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Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on the aggregate investor allocation 
is as follows: 
 




The aggregate investor allocation captures 86.6% of variation in ten year annualized nominal 
stock returns, and is statistically significant at an =.01 (t-stat=-13.86). Note that based on the 
model, each additional 1% of financial assets in equities reduces subsequent ten year annualized 















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on the aggregate investor allocation is as 
follows: 
 




While the variation in subsequent real returns is lower than in the nominal return regression, it 
still captures a significant amount of variation in real returns – notice the coefficient is very 
similar to the coefficient in the nominal return regression. Adjusted R2 of 68.9% is a fairly good 
fit, and the corrected t-statistic of -6.81 is still statistically significant on an =.01 basis.  
 
Since the objective for an investor is to maximize real returns (per unit of risk), we regress on 
both nominal and real subsequent 10-year returns for all of our indicators. Notice that each 
additional percent of assets allocated to stocks corresponds with a decline of -0.68% in ten year 
annualized real returns. We find statistically significant negative correlations for all of our 










Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on Tobin’s Q is as follows: 
 




















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on Tobin’s Q is as follows: 
 




Notice that once again that our indicator, Tobin’s Q, captures less variation in real returns than in 
nominal returns. An adjusted R2 of 53.4% is still fairly respectable though. Note while Tobin’s Q 
is statistically significant, it’s less significant than the aggregate investor allocation to equities 













Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on Total Return CAPE is as follows: 
 




















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on Total Return CAPE is as follows: 
 




Notice that once again that Total Return CAPE captures less variation in real returns than in 
nominal returns. While the adjusted R2 starts to fall off at 29.7% of variation. TR CAPE is still 
testing as significant – while the t statistic is too close to that of Tobin’s Q to really be able to 
make a very clear indication of strength, the R2 of the Tobin’s Q regression was fitted much 
better. It is important to note that there is a significant disparity in observations between these 
two regressions, which could ultimately be leading to the disparity in fit. For this reason, it is 
unclear which indicator is stronger because there are no data to test the out of sample 
observations  that are included in the TR CAPE regression on Tobin’s Q. The Tobin’s Q t-
statistic could go either way in the future, especially considering the limitation of the sample. 
The Tobin’s Q and aggregate investor allocation are clearly more comparable because they 





It is possible that the 10-year treasury yield (or historical equivalent) could add explanatory 
power to our regressions, on grounds that investors would accept lower expected returns on 
stocks if bond yields were lower, so we add the long interest rate to our regressions which 
include TR CAPE and CAPE. 
 
Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both Total Return CAPE and the 
10-year interest rate is as follows: 
 













Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both Total Return CAPE and the 10- 
year interest rate is as follows: 
 




Notice that the adjusted R2 value drops in both regressions compared to their respective 
regressions which do not include the long interest rate. After making Newey-West adjustments, 
the long interest rate does not appear to have any statistical significance. It is for this reason that 











Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on CAPE is as follows: 
 




















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on CAPE is as follows: 
 




Notice that neither the adjusted R2, nor the t statistic for CAPE drop off between the real and 
nominal regressions. Like TR CAPE, CAPE comes up as statistically significant when testing on 
many more observations than Tobin’s Q and the Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities (129 
obs. Vs. 64). Just like TR CAPE, this makes them impossible to directly compare, however when 
TR CAPE and CAPE are regressed on the same 64 observations (1945-2008) as Tobin’s Q and 
the Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities, they capture less variation over the time period, 










As mentioned in the TR CAPE & long interest rate regressions, the long interest rate does not 
add any considerable explanatory power; this also holds true in the CAPE regressions below. 
 
Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both CAPE and the 10-year 
interest rate is as follows: 
 














Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both CAPE and the 10-year interest 
rate is as follows: 
 

















Now we turn our attention to the models that include the Greenspan Put. As mentioned earlier, 
the correlation may be spurious, and regression fit may be high; this does not necessarily suggest 
a causal relationship, as all of the valuation indicators have been at historically high valuation 
levels on average since 1987. However, we may find some interesting results from the 
regressions. 
 
Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both the aggregate investor 
allocation and the Greenspan Put is as follows: 
 




The inclusion of the Greenspan Put adds no additional explanatory power. It is highly likely that 
the Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities already incorporates information from the 
Greenspan Put when determining the allocation. As a result, the two variables are likely to be 
collinear, with the aggregate allocation including much more other information that is 








Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both the aggregate investor allocation 
and the Greenspan Put is as follows: 
 




Once again, the Greenspan Put variable carries no additional statistically significant explanatory 
power. Any power that it adds to the following regressions could ultimately be from chance 
correlation, which divides the time series into a piecewise function where both sides have the 















Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both Tobin’s Q and the Greenspan 
Put is as follows: 
 



















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both Tobin’s Q and the Greenspan Put 
is as follows: 
 




This regression is particularly interesting because it is actually fit slightly better than the 
regression using the aggregate equity allocation. Both Tobin’s Q and the Greenspan Put are 
statistically significant after NW corrections. However, as noted earlier we cannot draw 
conclusions about causality about the Greenspan Put, as there are numerous omitted variables 
that may have changed over the period. For example, if we had created a binary variable that 
included and followed the flash crash of 1987, we would have had the same exact regression 
results. If we go down the rabbit hole, we could have also constructed a binary variable  that 
denoted years including and following the release of the Stanley Kubrick film, “Full Metal 
Jacket”. Once again, the results would be the exactly the same. The era of “high valuations” that 





be required to draw significant conclusions about the nature and cause of these elevated 
valuations.  
 
These remarks also apply to the subsequent return regressions on variations of TR CAPE and 
CAPE that include the Greenspan Put below.  
 
Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both Total Return CAPE and the 
Greenspan Put is as follows: 
 













Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both Total Return CAPE and the 
Greenspan Put is as follows: 
 


















Our specification for subsequent nominal returns regressed on both CAPE and the Greenspan Put 
is as follows: 
 


















Our specification for subsequent real returns regressed on both CAPE and the Greenspan Put is 
as follows: 
 
















The aggregate allocation to equities is of particular interest to us, not simply because it appears 
that it may have the best correlation to subsequent real returns over the following 10 years, but 
because the efficient market hypothesis’ implications directly affect the metric. The efficient 
market hypothesis’ claim that all investors pursue the highest return for an equivalent measure of 
risk has a corollary: in equilibrium the aggregate allocation to equities should only move 
higher if its expected returns per unit of expected risk increase in aggregate. Either expected 
return should be greater (holding expected risk constant) or expected risk should be lower 
(holding expected returns constant) when the allocation is higher. The regression of annualized 
real returns over the subsequent 10 years above clearly shows that when the investor allocation is 
high, investors’ subsequent returns are lower; however, if risk declined over the following period 
by more than returns declined, the shift upwards in the equity allocation could still be considered 
rational under efficient market theory. We construct a measure of risk below to test if historically 
high values of the aggregate investor allocation have been correlated with lower amounts of risk. 
 
We construct the average annual loss as a measure of risk. First, we identify years with gains and 
years with losses. Then we create a binary variable equal to 1 for years with losses and multiply 
it by the LN(return) vector to create a vector which only includes the size of losses in years of 
losses. For each year, we then average the size of those losses over the subsequent 10 years.  
 
Our Specification for average annual nominal losses (in years where losses occur) over the 
subsequent 10-year period regressed on the aggregate investor allocation is as follows: 
 







The regression above demonstrates that the aggregate equity allocation has a statistically 
significant negative relationship with the average annual nominal loss over subsequent 10-year 
periods (for years with losses). Since losses are measured as zero or negative, the negative sign 
on the regression coefficient indicates that losses are significantly greater following years of a 
high allocation to equities. 
 
While volatility is a common proxy for risk we disagree with its use as an indicator of risk. In an 
efficient market where actual returns are log-normally distributed, volatility as a primary 
indicator of risk would make sense since there is an equal chance of excess returns and excess 
declines over any given period. Volatility would be important because it would be an indicator of 
how far away portfolio value could diverge from the long-run return over a given period of time. 
While portfolio returns should revert back to this hypothetical mean return for portfolios of 
equivalent risk over a long enough time period, people are concerned about short term deviations 
because our lives are short. Another issue with volatility is that it increases when the size of 
positive excess returns increases (relative to historical excess returns); rational investors would 
generally accept this as a good thing. We believe that investors are ultimately concerned about 
the risk of losses (divergence below long-run expected returns) because investors may be forced 
to sell at unfavorable valuations due to unforeseen life circumstances. 
 
If we take this as a proxy for risk, it is implied that high equity allocations are in fact 
shown to have greater risk. A high equity allocation should only be consistent with higher 
expectations of return and/or lower expectations of risk. Our analysis shows that these 
expectations are likely to be irrational, as subsequent returns are lower and risk is greater. 
Below we conduct an empirical analysis of the factors which explain the level of the aggregate 
investor allocation: 
 
b. Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities Regressions 
 
1. Data is the same as above. 
 
2. Dependent Variables for Aggregate Investor Allocation Regressions 
a. Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities 
 
3. Independent Variables for Aggregate Investor Allocation Regressions 
a. Inflation Rate (current year) 
b. Inflation Rate over the Past 10 Years (annualized) 
c. Civilian Unemployment (U-3) 
d. The Ten-Year U.S. Treasury Yield (GS10) or Historical Equivalent 
e. Greenspan Put 
f. Expected Return (Koyck Lag =1%) 
g. Expected Return (Koyck Lag =3%) 
h. Nominal Expected Earnings Growth (Koyck Lag =1%) 
i. Nominal Expected Earnings Growth (Koyck Lag =3%) 
j. Real Expected Earnings Growth (Koyck Lag =1%) 






Since we have shown that a higher aggregate investor allocation is associated with lower returns 
and greater risk, we now turn our attention to the determinants of this metric. We use the current 
year inflation rate, civilian unemployment, and the inflation rate over the prior 10 years 
(annualized) in addition to the variables mentioned earlier.  
 
We construct Koyck distributed lag functions for a number of variables which denote 
expectations for the associated metric.  denotes the proportional weight of the current year. 
(𝟏 − ) denotes the proportional weight of the previous expectation. For each variable being 
tested we test two versions of the lag where =1% and 3%. When lambda is included in the 
Koyck distributed lag variables below it does not include the percentage symbol. All of the 
expectations are annualized. The functional form of the Koyck lag for expected nominal returns 
is as follows: 
 
𝑬𝑹𝑲𝒐𝒚𝒄𝒌𝟎𝒕 =   ∗ 𝒍𝒏 (
𝑺𝒕
𝑺𝒕−𝟏




𝑬𝑹𝒕 is the expected future return at time t, and 𝑬𝑹𝒕−𝟏 is the expected future return at time t – 1. 
𝑺𝒕 is the nominal portfolio value (with dividends reinvested) at time t, and 𝑺𝒕−𝟏 is the nominal 
portfolio value (with dividends reinvested) at time t – 1. We use the natural log to calculate 
returns because it is additively symmetric while arithmetic returns are not.  
 
The functional form of the Koyck lag for expected real earnings growth is as follows: 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕 =   ∗ 𝒍𝒏 (
 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕−𝟏
) + (𝟏 − ) ∗ 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕−𝟏 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕 is the expectation of future real earnings growth at time t, and 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕−𝟏 is 
the expectation of future real earnings growth at time t – 1. 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕 is the current 
year’s real earnings growth, and 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕−𝟏 is the prior year’s real earnings. 
 
The functional form of the Koyck lag for expected nominal earnings growth is as follows: 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒕 =   ∗ 𝒍𝒏 (
𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕
𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕−𝟏
) + (𝟏 − ) ∗ 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒕−𝟏 
 
𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒕 is the expectation of future nominal earnings growth at time t, 
and 𝑬𝑬𝑮𝟎𝑵𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒕−𝟏 is the expectation of future nominal earnings growth at time t – 1.  
 
Now since the Koyck weights for the present year are very low, this means that it can take a 
significant period of time for past years to drop out. When evaluating an approach to the model, 
we considered using higher weights on the present year, and dropping the earliest data in the 
sample when running regressions. We decided against this because the Koyck expected return 
was far too volatile, and frequently fell below zero in the event of a market crash or a prolonged 
decline. Expected long-run returns should always be positive, otherwise no one would hold the 






What we decided to do instead may be problematic: we maintained low weights on the current 
year, and entered in the geometric average return from the end of 1871 to the end of 2018 as the 
first expected Koyck return in the data.  
 
Theoretically this is not reasonable – someone in 1871 simply could not have perfect foresight of 
150 years of data and then decided what their expected return is was going to be. However, we 
insert the geometric average return in the first year because our analysis is concerned with 
time variation in expected returns due to recent experience being built into expectations. 
Had we used these small weights on the current year and utilized the first year’s return, this also 
would have theoretical problems; clearly one year of returns is not enough to develop 
expectations for the long-run. We figured that by using the geometric average, any deviation 
from a “reasonable” long-run return would be captured by our Koyck distributed lags.  
 
4. Regression Specifications and Results 
 
Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on Nominal Expected Earnings 
Growth (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 



















Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on Nominal Expected Earnings 
Growth (Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows: 
 




Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on Real Expected Earnings 
Growth (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 












Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on Real Expected Earnings 
Growth (Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows: 
 




The expected real earnings growth metrics seem to have some explanatory power on the 
Aggregate Investor Allocation to Equities. We move on to more extensive models below.  
 
Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, Expected Return (Koyck Lag =1%), and Real 
Expected Earnings Growth (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗








Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, Expected Return (Koyck Lag =3%), and Real 
Expected Earnings Growth (Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗




Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, and Expected Return (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗








Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, and Expected Return (Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows:  
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗





Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the annualized inflation rate 
over the past 10 years, U-3, the 10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, and Expected Return 
(Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏𝟎𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗








Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the annualized inflation rate 
over the past 10 years, U-3, the 10-year treasury (GS10), Greenspan Put, and Expected Return 
(Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏𝟎𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗





Now we drop the Greenspan Put variable.  Our specification for the aggregate investor 
allocation regressed on the annualized inflation rate over the past 10 years, U-3, the 10-year 
treasury (GS10), and Expected Return (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏𝟎𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗








Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the annualized inflation rate 
over the past 10 years, U-3, the 10-year treasury (GS10), and Expected Return (Koyck Lag 
=3%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝒂𝒔𝒕𝟏𝟎𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗




Notice that the explanatory power only decreased slightly when eliminating the Greenspan Put. 
This seems to suggest that both the Greenspan Put and past annualized 10-year inflation rate may 
act as proxies for periods where monetary policy is effective. Since the Greenspan Put is marked 
at a relatively arbitrary date (1987), we drop the Greenspan Put since the past 10 years of 

























Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), and Expected Return (Koyck Lag =1%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗




Our specification for the aggregate investor allocation regressed on the inflation rate, U-3, the 
10-year treasury (GS10), and Expected Return (Koyck Lag =3%) is as follows: 
 
𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝑼𝒏𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗








Interpretations of Results  
 
a. Investor/Expert Conflict of Interest – Division of funds by asset class, Long term 
nature of the indicators, and Career Risk/Lack of a “Permanent Capital Base” 
 
Since most funds tie investment manager salary and bonuses to assets under management 
(AUM), and they are generally restrained to a particular asset class, managers may advocate to 
keep assets within the asset classes that they manage in order to maximize short term 
compensation, despite lower expected returns due to overbidding of financial assets. While the  
 
Even large asset managers which have AUM across the whole spectrum of asset types may 
face restrictions when optimally allocating capital. The client-facing side of the business, 
wealth management, is often disjoint from fund managers. Since all clients have different needs 
based primarily on household income/wealth, and age, wealth managers will often advocate for a 
certain type of portfolio mix based off of long-run historical return, risk/volatility metrics, and 
individualized needs, despite evidence suggesting that asset returns may be relatively predictable 
in the medium term (10-15 years). Since equities tend to outperform all other asset classes 
over long periods of time, there is a tendency for a large percentage of financial capital to 
cluster in equities because of a systemic failure of wealth managers to rebalance client 
portfolios. 
 
b. Portfolio Rebalancing 
 
If the evidence seems to indicate that prices are getting to be too high, why don’t people decide 
to sell? Why don’t people periodically rebalance toward fixed portfolio weights? The evidence 
seems to suggest that wealth managers and their clients just “let it ride”, and since equity returns 
tend to be greater than most other assets the equity weight steadily climbs up. There may be a 
belief among many people that equities always outperform in the long-run, but then you would 
generally expect the equity allocation to be much higher if this were true.  
 
We think that the people fail to periodically rebalance portfolios because it is difficult to sell 
when prices are increasing or to buy when prices are falling. In Manias, Panics, and Crashes, 
Charles Kindleberger claims that "There is nothing as disturbing to one's well-being and 
judgment as to see a friend get rich."36 When everyone around you is getting rich while you wait 
on the sidelines, it can be very isolating and difficult to stick with your strategy. Being 
comfortable with being a contrarian is one of the most useful attributes that a fund manager can 
have (of course when it is backed up by well thought out research).  
 
The world can be very cruel to people who say that the party’s over – which is effectively what 
you are doing when you sell out positions; company executives absolutely hate short sellers 
because there is a perception that they want the company to fail. More often times, short sellers 
believe that investor expectations are too high, even in scenarios where managers meet all of 
their own goals, and so they take short positions.  
 
                                                 
36 Kindleberger, Charles P., and Aliber, Robert Z.,  Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 6th 





Imagine then how people react when an investor says that they aren’t holding any equities 
whatsoever. If there is a perception that short sellers want individual companies to fail, then 
people may extrapolate this and suggest that getting out of the market or shorting it means that 
you want all businesses to fail. While contrarian investors are just trying to correct mispricing, 
everyone around them treats them with suspicion because of a lack of understanding about the 
reasons for investment/divestment. 
 
In order to achieve materially different returns from the market you must differentiate your 
positions from that of the overall market. In the pursuit of superior risk-adjusted returns, an 
investor has to think that they are smarter than the overall market at pricing securities. When you 
take positions that significantly differentiate your portfolio from the rest of the market people 
may look at you odd. No one likes someone who is smarter than them, and you have to think that 
you are smarter than most to succeed and try differentiated strategies. People will interpret your 
decision to differentiate as an insult because they feel you saying that everyone else is wrong. 
Perhaps this is why many people have a specious attitude that connects a person’s wealth with 
their supposed level of intelligence. When you have money at risk in the market, and there are 
rich people making the same decision as you, believing that they are smart is comforting because 
it allows you to rationalize making the same decision.  
 
c. Chance Correlation  
 
Do stock returns follow a random walk, or are the findings on the aggregate investor allocation 
to equities, Tobin’s Q, TR CAPE, and CAPE compelling? A skeptical manager might reasonably 
think as follows: might this just be another case of finding relationships which have happened to 
hold in the past, such as that of the "Super Bowl Indicator," (which held up through 2008) but 
may not hold in the future? Before urging clients to act on these indicators, wealth managers 
need compelling arguments as to why these relationships hold, need evidence that they will 
continue to hold after first being brought to attention.  
 
Wealth managers need accurate estimates of expected returns over the next ten years using these 
indicators. I can do my best to give my client full information, but what would I give as my best 
estimate if forced to give a single number and a confidence interval? Is our level of confidence 
high enough to rely on these regressions rather than the long-run average return? 
 
Our regression on subsequent ten-year annualized returns utilizing the aggregate investor 
allocation to equities had a 95% confidence interval for our coefficient; This shows that each 
additional percent of total capital (shown in the denominator in the model section) in equities 




Our paper is ultimately limited by practical difficulties in data analysis related to observing the 
theoretical market portfolio. While basic models such as CAPM utilize the equity market as a 
proxy for the diversified market portfolio, our study is also limited in that we do not observe all 
constituent elements of the market portfolio. While the CAPM and Black-Scholes model both 





to U.S. Treasury bond issuance, our theoretical model differs from others in that we consider 
non-equity, non-treasury bond/bill financial assets’ value when evaluating subsequent return 
data. Evaluating equity valuations within a fully contextualized investment environment is 
conducive to finding more theoretically plausible relationships because asset allocation choices 
are generally made with regard to the entire spectrum of asset class opportunities. Excluding 
anyone of these from an analysis can lead to significant distortions, since financial assets are 
slightly imperfect substitutes – while various financial assets carry individual characteristics 
which make them particularly attractive to various investor classes, the ultimate pursuit of any 
coldly rational investment activity is to maximize expected returns with minimal expected risk. 
 
V. Discussion & Conclusions 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis presents a compelling way to understand securities markets, 
and the tremendous difficulty in outperforming the market on a risk-adjusted basis. However, 
while the EMH presents a straightforward way to understand how market prices incorporate new 
information, anomalies in models of asset pricing which do not carry risks present a hiccup in the 
rationalist theory that expected returns are developed to reward investors for taking on 
commensurate levels of risk. It is foolish to deny the recurrences of speculative mania driven by 
greed (or fear) and short-sightedness. While speculative bubbles do not necessarily occur often, 
they appear infrequently and may expand and deflate over long periods of time or in an explosive 
fashion. It is because of this tendency of capital markets, that it is of absolute necessity to 
research how financial assets prices are reached. 
 
We use the aggregate investor allocation to equities as a proxy measure for overvaluation in 
securities markets (as well as Tobin’s Q, Shiller TR CAPE, and Shiller CAPE). Between 1945 
and 2008 (year-end), historically high values for the aggregate investor allocation to equities 
have been highly correlated with much lower real returns over subsequent 10-year time periods 
(1945-1955 through 2008-2018). High values for equity allocation to equities are also correlated 
with higher average losses over the subsequent 10-year periods.  Following high allocation to 
equities, we find lower average returns and greater losses. All of the other indicators listed also 
show a statistically significant inverse relationship with subsequent real returns as well, though 
with varying levels of correlation and different sample sizes. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
does not account for this relationship, and we feel that ultimately Hyman Minsky’s Financial 
Instability Hypothesis presents a more realistic view of booms and busts in securities markets. 
While Eugene Fama argues that there is no effective way to test for speculative bubbles, we 
disagree; the aggregate investor allocation to equities acts as a highly significant indicator for 
subsequent returns, and in particular this indicator is significantly related to return and risk 
expectations that place an emphasis on recent experience. Our analysis of expectation 
development shows that investors mistakenly perceive a combination of higher returns and lower 
risk for future returns following periods of relative prosperity, and vice versa. 
 
While we do not exhaustively go into Minsky’s thoughts about the various types of debt 
financing that drive instability, this empirical evidence substantiates his contention that “stability 
is destabilizing”. Periods of high returns are predictably followed by lower returns; this stands in 
contrast to the idea that stock prices exhibit Brownian motion as forwarded by efficient market 





mean reversion in pricing, we can make an argument for it using our analysis. Our analysis 
shows that a significant portion of variation in stock returns over subsequent 10-year periods can 
be explained by variation in the aggregate allocation to stocks.  
 
It is important to note that while this metric provides a great deal of insight into future real 
returns, another significant component of real returns is the growth in real liabilities in the 
economy, which is of course not a real-time variable. It can only be observed ex-post, and so it is 
of no use to investors today. However, the theoretical implications of this other component are 
very useful for understanding the various factors at play that determine stock returns. Investors 
can guess how the aggregate allocation to equities may change over the next 10 years, and 
forecast real liability growth to develop expectations of return given various assumptions to 
better evaluate their current asset allocation strategies.  
 
Various economists and financial economists have brought forward the proposition that investors 
may have improved return prospects when investing during recessionary periods because they 
are willing to accept cyclical risks. This is an interesting proposition that casts doubt on the idea 
that investors are acting irrationally, as we propose. When you’re in a crumbling castle and 
you’re unable to see the light out, should those who have faith be duly rewarded? This is truly 
the epitome of Warren Buffet’s famous quote, “be fearful when others are greedy and greedy 
when others are fearful.”  
 
But what about economies that did crumble? The stock market during the Weimar 
Hyperinflation is just one example. In an attempt to avoid hyperinflation, investors sunk their 
money into the stock market and drove respectable dividend yields down to below 1%, and 
investors never recouped their money.  
 
Investors who stayed invested certainly took on significant risks, and they were harmed when the 
system fell apart. When setting expectations of the future, nothing is truly certain; this 
conundrum is difficult to assess. It is important to note however, that equity prices did not 
suddenly jump back up to historical values following events like the end of WWII. 
 
When looking back in economic history, there have clearly been instances of speculative bubbles 
fueled by irrational behavior (whether driving asset prices up or down significantly); the Dutch 
tulip bubble, the 1920s Florida Housing Boom, the 1929 stock market bubble, the U.S. Market 
Crash of 1987, the rise and fall of Japanese stocks and real estate in the 1990s, the dot-com 
bubble, & the ownership society bubble are some examples of positive bubbles. Negative 
bubbles include the slump in stock prices during WWII, and the market bottom in 1982 during 
the Volcker Disinflation. While our proxy is a valuable indicator for equity overvaluation and 
undervaluation, it is because of these types of out of sample observations that we cannot 
conclude that it is the only metric that ought to be considered when evaluating whether or not 
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